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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------SHARON M. DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
vs.

Case No. D-79-2691

CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent sued Appellant for a Divorce, alimony, and.
division of the property of the parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor, without a Jury on May 15, 1981.

The Court granted a

Decree of Divorce to the Respondent, awarded her $420.00 per
month alimony, and distributed the property between the parties.
The Appellant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

On September 1, 1981,

the Court heard argument and modified the Decree of Divorce.
Decree, Order of Appellant's Objections, Conclusions of Law,
Findings of Fact, and Order were signed September 29, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order remanding the matter for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-1-by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The

further testimony, or modification of the Decree of Divorce upon
the grounds that the Trial Court abused its discretion by
awarding alimony, inequitably dividing the real property of the
parties, and requiring the Appellant to wait an unreasonable
length of time for his share of the equity in the residence, and
compelling Appellant to sell his New Mexico land and give
Respondent one-third of the proceeds, and ordering Appellant to
pay $1,000.00 of Respondent's attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on March 4th,
1974 in Evantson, Wyoming.
marriage.

No children were born of the

However, three minor children of the Plaintiff born of

a previous marriage lived with the parties.

The Defendant pro-

vided the principal support for the Plaintiff and her minor
children until May 15th, 1980, the date of separation.

(Tr 44,

lines 25-30)
Prior to the marriage, Defendant purchased fbur, onehalf acre lots in New Mexico under a Real Estate Contract dated
June, 1967, for $6,200.00.

(Tr 53, lines

6~27)

A substantial

portion of the balance was paid prior to the marriage in 1974.
After the marriage, the Defendant continued making all of the
remaining payments from his income.

Between the years 1974 and

1978, during which time the contract was paid in full, the
Plaintiff had no gainful employment.

(Tr 53, lines 22-30)

Therefore, the Plaintiff in no way contributed toward the
_acquisition of the New Mexico property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prior to the marriage, the Plaintiff had acquired an
interest in the residence in which the Plaintiff .and Defendant
resided.

The original purchase price of that property under a

Uniform Real Estate Contract executed by the Plaintiff and her
prior husband was $18,900.00.

At the time of the marriage in

1974, the first mortgage against the
(Tr 10, lines 3-6)

res~dence

was $18,210.00.

The Plaintiff, therefore, had an equity

of approximately $3,000.00 in the residence which was valued at
$21,000.00.'

This particular $3,000.00 equity was confirmed by

the fact that shortly after the Plaintiff and Defendant were
married, Plaintiff suggested that the Defendant pay off her prior
husband's lien against the property of $1,300.00 (Tr 5, lines
19-29)

The Defendant did, in fact, pay off the former husband's

equity with a cash payment of $1,300.00.

(Tr 33, lines 5-15)

At

that time, a deed was executed placing the property in the name
of the Plaintiff and Defendant as joint tenants with full rights
of survivorship.

Shortly after the marriage, the Defendant com-

menced to substantially improve the residence by remodelling the
house and purchasing new furnishings.

In six and one-half years

of marriage, the Defendant expended approximately $40,000.00 as
follows:
1.

Second mortgage with Commercial Security Bank

($15,000.00 principal, $5,708.00 interest) (Tr 25, lines 16-30)
2.

Personal injury settlement in 1973 for $8,500.00

(Tr 84, lines 8-16)
3.

Inheritance

fro~

mother's estate was $5,000.00 (Tr

-3-
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84, lines 23-25)
4.

Personal injury settlement in 1978 for $7,000.00

(Tr 84, lines 17-22)
At the time of the separation in May of 1980, the residence was
appraised by Defendant's appraiser at $78,000.00 and by the
Plaintiff's appraiser at $61,500.00 •. (Tr

7,

line 9)

The house was inadequate and bare when Defendant moved
in.

(Tr page 86, lines 25-30)
The Court ordered the Defendant to sell the New Mexico

property and give Plaintiff one-third of the proceeds.

The

Defendant was awarded only $11,500.00 of the equity in the residence at the time of the divorce, together with one-halr of any
future appreciation until Plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells,
or her youngest child attains the age of majority.

It is evident

that the Appellant is receiving substantially less than one-half
of the equity in the house.

$18,900.00 and by using the

The original value of the home was
Plaint~ff's

appraisal of $61,500.00

at the time of the Divorce, the equity would be $42,600.00.
Therefore, Appellant should have been awarded a minimum of

$21,300.00 plus any appreciation.
The Plaintiff was awarded most of the personal property,
including the furnishings.

The Defendant was ordered to pay

$420.00 per month alimony ($345.00 on the second mortgage
payments and $rf5.00 addit·ional alimony) until the second mortgage
of approximately $16,ooo.oo is paid in full.
payments of the second mortgage are

-4-

$345. 00.

The monthly
Defc~1dant
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is .lot to

participate in any equity created by the payment of alimony which
is earmarked for payment on the second mortgage.
The Plaintiff was -0rdered to pay approximately $1,200.00
in indebtedness and the Defendant was ordered to pay approximatley $9,000.00. in indebtedness, together with $1,000.00 towards
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ALIMONY AS PART OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
IN WHICH APPELLANT WILL NOT PARTICIPATE WHEN
THE PROPERTY IS SOLD.
At the time the parties

w~re

married, the Respondent

still had three minor children residing with her.
supported them as well as the Respondent.

The Appellant

The parties lived

together for approximately six (6) years during which time the
Respondent was not employed.

The substantial support of the

family was derived from the Appellants income.
During the course of the marriage, the Appellant not
only paid off the Respondent's former husband's equity in the
house, he purchased new furnishings and fixtures.

The parties

jointly borrowed $20,000.00 to remodel the residence.

This loan

was secured by a second mortgage against the residence payable at
$345.00 per month.

To assist the remodelling and refurnishing,

the Defendant further expended $5,000.00 received from his
mother's estate and $15,500.00 insurance proceeds realized from
Defendant's personal injuries.

-5-
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The additions to the residence greatly enhanced the comfort of the residence and increased its value.

The second

mortgage was being paid by the Appellant prior to their separation.
As part of the Decree of Divorce, the Court ordered the
Appellant to pay alimony in the sum of $420.00 per month until
the second mortgage was paid in full.
down as follows:

The $420.00 was broken

$75.00 cash and $345.00 payment on the second

mortgage.
This alimony payment in and of itself may not appear to
be onerousj and it certainly provides financial assistance to the
Respondent who may be in need of economic help for a short time.
However, the Court, by not providing for the Appellant to recover
at least to the extent of 50%. of the principal payments toward
the second mortgage, was an abuse of discretion.

The Respondent

not only benefits from the immediate financial assistance, she
also gets all of the equity derived from the mortgage payments
made by the Appellant when the residence is sold.

Surely, the

$75.00 per month is more than ample alimony to be paid by the
Appellant in light of the short number of years they were married
and the financial· benefits Respondent and her children received
during the marriage period.
The Court held in Jesperson vs. Jesperson, (1980) 610
P2d 326 at page 328 as follows:
"We have previously held that a trial court must consider many factors in making a property settle~e~t in a
divorce proceeding, but that the purpose of the settle-

-6-
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ment should not impose punishment on either party . • •

. . ."

"In making a property division, a Court may properly
consider such things as the length of the marriage and
parties respective contributions to the marriage. This
marriage lasted less than six (6) years and no children
issued therefrom."
In Read vs. Read, (1979) 594 2d 871, the Court said at
page 872:
"If it appears that the Decree is so discordant with an
equitable allocation that it will more likely lead to
further difficulties and distress than to serve the
desired objective, then a reappraisal of the Decree must
be undertaken."
It is obvious that resentment develops when alimony is
granted to one of the parties when the marriage has been of short
duration and no issue was born of the marriage.

It is therefore,

understandable that the Appellant would be extremely unhappy at
the prospects of not only paying substantial alimony in the form
of mortgage payments when he is not even allowed to recover one
red cent when the property is sold many years later.

It has the

effect of really paying the other spouse twice - once by
relieving the spouse of making the mortgage payment, and then
allowing the same spouse to get the "built up equity" when the
house is sold.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GIVING
THE RESPONDENT AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF THE EQUITY
IN THE RESIDENCE AND COMPELLING THE APPELLANT TO
SELL HIS NEW MEXICO PROPERTY IN WHICH HE MADE ALL
. THE Pf\ YMENTS.

Both of the parties had prior

marriage~.

The Appellant
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was older and was supporting three minor children of his prior
marriage as well as the Respondent's minor children.

At the time

of the marriage, he had been paying on some vacant lots in New
Mexico for approximately six (6) years.

After the marriage, from

his earnings he made the remaining payments on the real estate
contract.
The Respondent brought into the marriage three minor
children and a residence.

From the prior divorce, the equity in

their property was determined to be approximately Three Thousand
Dollars ($3,000.00).

The former husband was awarded a $1,300.00

lien on their residence.

The Respondent asked the Appellant to

pay off her former husband's equity, which he did.

Thereafter,

the Respondent executed a new Deed making each of the parties
joint tenants.

It appears.that the intent was to thereafter

recognize each other as equal owners.
The Respondent did not have any gainful employment.
The result was that the first and second mortgage payments as
well as the family food, clothing, and other necessities were
provided by the Appellant.

At the time of the marriage, the

first mortgage was approximately ($18,210.00).

At the time of

the Divorce, the value of the residence was between $61,500.00
and $78,ooo.oo depending on which appraisal is used.

The first

($14,421.90) and second ($15,876.26) mortgages would total
approximately $30,298.16.

Therefore, the equity would be between

$31,000.00 and $48,000.00, all of which equ"ity has been acquired
during the marriage.

Appellant paid for the entire equity by way

. of mortgage payments and the purchase of the former husband's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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interest.

In addition, the Appellant must pay off the entire

second mortgage by which time the Respondent's youngest child
will be approaching eighteen years of age, at which time the
equity will have been increased $15,876.26.

Under the cir-

cumstances why is it not reasonable for the Appellant to expect
one-half of the entire equity which he has substantially created
rather than the minimal $11,500.00 plus one-half of the increase
due from inflation?

In all fairness, it would appear that the

Appellant should be entitled to $11,500.00 plus the return of the
second mortgage payments and one-half of the equity realized by
inflation.

The Respondent at most should receive one-half of the

total equity, none of which was acquired by any financial contribution on her part.

As an additional benefit, she will have

realized the use and possession of the residence until the residence is sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
The Appellant has not only received an unfair distributive share of the residence, the Court has ordered him to sell
the New Mexico land which he purchased six (6) years prior to the
marriage and made every payment subsequent to the marriage.

Why

should the Respondent receive any interest in the out of state
property when she has made no contribution for it acquisition?
Certainly the $75.00 per month alimony should fully compensate
her for any loss she may have suffered as a result of the
marriage and divorce.
This particular type of inequitable distribution was met
by

the Court in the case of Read vs. Read (1979) 594 P2d 871 at

-9-
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page 872, the Court said:
"
It is well established that the Trial Court has
considerable discretion in the allocation of the property and financial resources of the parties.
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely without
1 imi t. • • . . "
"
When a marriage has failed, a Court's duty is to
consider the various factors relating to the situation
and to arrange the best allocation of the property and
the economic resources of the parties so that the parties and their children can pursue their lives in as
happy and useful manner as possible.
In view of these
principles, it is our view that the property award in
this case is too desparate and that the Decree must be
modified. In light of this conclusion, and because the
case is equitable in nature, this Court may either exercise its own preragative of making a modification in the
Decree or remand for entry of a modified Decree by the
Trial Court."
The Court also considered the consequences of the sale
of real property when it could be a severe disadvantage to the
other property.

In Berry vs. Berry (1981) N.

17165 Filed July

30, 1981, the Court states at page 36 of the State of Utah
Bulletin Number 81-14, August 15, 1981:
"
Because of his financial condition, we find that
this was an abuse of discretion. The Order requiring
the Defendant to purchase her interest is unfairly
weighted in her favor and creates a burden upon him
which he should not be expected to bear at this time
under the present circurrstances.n
In the instant case, the Appellant is ordered to sell
the lots purchased by the Appellant and give Respondent one-third
of the net proceeds.

Why should the Appellant be ordered to sell

this property in a destressed market in order to satisfy this
one-third unearned interest?

The Court itself admitted, after

hearing oral argument on September 1, 1981, that he had no way of
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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knowing its value.

The Trial Court said,

"With regard to the ranch property, I struggled with .
that for quite a while and can find no other way to find
out the true market value of that property than to sell
it and divide the proceeds." (Tr 19, lines 15-18)
The inequity of the property distribution becomes more
obvious when considering that the Respondent received virtually
all of the furniture and furnishings acquired by the parties, the
Respondent was ordered to pay some $1,200.00 in debts, the
Appellant was ordered to pay $9,000.00 in debts and $1,000.00
toward Respondent's attorneys fees.
It may be argued that Appellant did get to keep his
Retirement account, but under the circumstances, it would appear
that the Respondent has done nothing to deserve any share in it.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not received an equitable share in the
distribution of the property of the parties.

The Trial Court

abused its discretion in not providing that the Appellant recover
at least one-half of the monies which he has and will invest in
the property prior to its sale together with one-half of the
appreciation.

The Trial Court further abused its discretion in

awarding the Respondent a one-third interest in the New Mexico
property when it was purchased by the Appellant prior to the
marriage, and she made no payments subsequent to the marriage.
This unfairness is multiplied by the Decree ordering that the
property be sold in order to determine its

m~rket

value.

Appellant respectfully requests.this Court to modify the
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Decree of Divorce in accord with fairness or in the alternative,
remand the case for further hearing.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this

_!f___

day of January, 1982.

BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCEN~

Henr'y S. Nygaard
Attorney for Appellant,
Charles Francis Davis

-12-
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